The ability of communities to realize Pareto efficient outcomes may potentially be realized through the practice of fiscal zoning. A common concern to this theory is the prospect that political boundaries may undermine this process. If nuisance entities produce negative externalities that decay over distance and host fee compensation is completely internalized, then host fee compensation need not reflect the full external damages if the nuisance is sited along a political border. Furthermore, if a nuisance entity can credibly commit to being sited on either side of the border, host fee compensation can fall to zero. This paper presents a simple theoretical model that helpfully describes an empirical strategy for testing the political boundary hypothesis among local governments. The strategy is applied to wind turbines in the continental United States across 1,258 local governments. The results are not supportive of the concerns and actually indicate that land near political boundaries is less likely to be used for nuisance siting.
The principle of separation of uses led to the color-coded zoning maps pinned up in most town halls: residential here, commercial over there, and industrial over by the other town's border. ~Anthony Flint (2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION
Are local governments more accommodative of land uses that generate negative spatial externalities along their political boundaries than other similar areas? That is, are there cases where local governments would refuse development permissions if their own citizens had to fully bear the nuisance costs? These questions speak directly to the broader question of whether or not local governments can be trusted to handle their own affairs, particularly in defining regulatory and tax policies within a federalist system. This paper seeks to contribute evidence on the political boundary concern by studying the location of wind turbines within the local government areas that regulate their land use. Wind turbines are a useful case for this purpose because, although they can generate regional benefits, they are also producers of light, noise, and other nuisances that render them unpleasant to the immediately surrounding residents.
The spatial pattern of economic activities, from the location of industrial plants to the minimum lot sizes for single family homes, is commonly managed by local governments through the regulatory framework of zoning. The use of zoning to determine the politically acceptable locations for differing types of economic activity is one of the most routine, and controversial, functions of local government. As a first approximation, the use of zoning can be viewed as a supply-side restriction of land sites, which allows for a Coasian bargaining process to occur between residents and the demanders of these sites, potentially resulting in market-like efficiency outcomes (Fischel 1985) . In the case where prospective demanders of land are undesirable to the residents of the existing communities they may offer fiscal benefits, either through property taxation or other forms of developer compensation, in exchange for the locals' tolerance of their nuisance traits via accommodating regulation (Fischel 2001) . A concerning barrier to an efficient outcome is introduced by the existence of political boundaries that internalize fiscal benefits of the transaction while ostensibly permitting local spillover disamentities into a neighboring community and cause the community to underestimate the costs of permissive zoning. Such situations can potentially pit localities against one another in a prisoners' dilemma style game in which small adjustments to location have discontinuous financial effects, with potentially inefficient allocation of land space along borders being the consequence.
Of course, there simultaneously exists a robust literature of repeat games that theoretically solve these games, particularly in community commons. Furthermore, decades of research has sought to study strategies for overcoming "Nimbyism," in which some socially desirable entity is demanded at the abstract level but has objections raised within localities, which suggests that siting such entities is extremely difficult.
1 Regardless, the hypothesis that political borders encourage disamenity exporting can be simultaneously true as competing influences, requiring empirical evidence to settle the dominant net effect. Convincing causal identification, however, is a daunting challenge.
One problem for testing the political border externality hypothesis is the presence of omitted variables. Nuclear power plants, a common example of Nimbyism in local zoning, require significant access to water bodies for waste heat discharge, but political boundaries are oftentimes the product of geographic boundaries like rivers and lakes, making it difficult to discern how prominent the role disamenity exporting may have factored into the outcome. A second empirical challenge is in the construction of an appropriate counterfactual, since the cleanest prediction offered by theory is that nuisance entities will be set "close" to borders relative to some alternative reality where the use did not generate disamenities. As a result, comparing across land-use types places a significant burden on the researcher to generate a satisfactory list of controls that would explain away other relevant differences. Returning to the example of a nuclear power plant, the ideal counterfactual would be similar facilities sans disamenities.
This paper develops an alternative strategy to testing the disamenity exporting hypothesis. To begin, a simple model that captures the political border concerns is developed with an aim towards testable prediction rather than social welfare implications. A central prediction of the hypothesis is that within the spatial distance of the disamenity effect there should also be a political boundary separating the land owners from another political community.
A grid of unique land points is generated over local communities to be treated as the unit of observation. Within the local governing body, both the proximity to a nuisance and the relevant political border can be measured. Since the theory concerns where nuisances are sited within a community rather than which communities adopt them, the dataset can be limited to only those which have nuisance activities, with selection effects mitigated by local government fixed effects. This limits the need for control variables to only those attributes that vary within the local government boundaries that would be correlated with proximity to the political boundary.
The nuisance entities serving as the empirical setting for this strategy is medium-to-large commercial grade wind-turbines in the United States, which are useful examples of the traditional NIMBY siting problem. At a global level, wind energy is regarded by many as a socially desirable alternative to energy production with fossil fuels. At the local level, however, wind turbines are noise and light pollutants that can disturb the local population. 2 This choice of wind turbines then doubles as a public policy relevant motivation for empirical research, in addition to providing insight into important public economic theory, as many states attempt to determine the appropriate regulatory structure for wind energy. The case for state level regulation and oversight of siting decisions strengthens when local governments fail to overcome intercommunity conflicts over siting.
The next section more fully describes the theory and reviews the previous empirical literature, which aids in explaining both why the empirical literature has been limited and subsequently motivates the need for the approach developed in this paper. Section 3 proceeds to formally lay out the empirical strategy.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Contemporary theoretical models of local nuisance entities can be traced to a literature motivated by the siting of hazardous facilities that raised dueling concerns of efficient Coasian outcomes from victim compensation and a potential "race to the bottom" due to environmental policy competition. Oates and Schwabb (1988) provided an influential theoretical model to demonstrate that attempts to attract taxable capital while free-riding on environmental regulation of neighboring jurisdictions would result in local communities selecting excessively lax environmental standards. Although empirical interest in the potential "Race to the Bottom" phenomena generated a large literature of its own (Shadbegian and Wolverton 2010) , the theoretical literature quickly drew attention to the efficiency conditions of victim compensation from nuisance facility sitings.
Citing the inability U.S. EPA's inability to cite any of its 50 to 125 proposed hazardous waste sites between 1980 and 1985 , Mitchell and Carson (1986 provided a taxonomy of the nuisance siting problem as one arising from ambiguous local community property rights, the rise of the "not in my back yard" social movement, and a lack of compensation mechanisms that could satisfy local voters. Baumol and Oates (1988) would provide a model where social welfare was reduced by voter compensation because victims paid to expose themselves to pollution would be less likely to move away from a polluting facility, causing an increase in total exposure to pollution. Sullivan (1990) would extend this model by allowing for land rent adjustment from victim compensation to affect population density, so that efficiency and equity effects would become a function of the compensation scheme and several other parameter values in key assumptions. Perhaps because of the ambiguity of results of efficiency models, the literature on victim compensation schemes expanded considerably. For instance, Kunreuther et al. (1987) suggested a mechanism where every community in a region would submit a minimum amount to accept the bid for a nuisance facility that produced regional benefits, with the lowest bid community accepting the facility funded by the higher bid communities. O 'Sullivan (1993) demonstrated the efficiency consequences of a voluntary auction game where all cities in a region would submit a willingness-to-accept bid for a noxious facility, with the lowest bid city accepting the noxious facility while receiving the highest bid as compensation. Perez-Castrillo Hunter and Leyden, 1995; Himmelberger et. al., 1991; Nieves et al., 1992; Mansfield et al., 2002; Claro, 2007; Groothuis et al., 2008; Garrone and Groppi, 2012) .
The other direction for the theoretical research has been to better understand the efficiency implications of the political process in nuisance facility sitings. Swallow et al. (1992) provide a segue between these literatures by considering a compensation scheme that satisfied a regional group of political stakeholders that can benefit from a nuisance siting, as well as a local group which is harmed and can potentially thwart the central government's siting process. Hamilton (1993) introduced heterogeneity in the ability of local communities to organize political opposition to hazardous facilities, with the consequence that firms did not necessarily site into locations that resulted in the lowest level of externalities. Frederickson (2000) formally models the role of local government lobbying in alternative centralized and decentralized federal systems of hazardous facility sitings. The model provides a prima facie case for a decentralized system because the conditions under which a centralized compensation schemes could replicate a decentralized system are stringent. Feinman et al. (2004) model the location of a noxious facility in a linear space between two cities, where each is subject to political pressures of city-level lobbies of landowners. They demonstrate that a political equilibrium of lobbying landowners can produce the social welfare maximizing result when property distribution is perfectly equitable and all cities participate in the political arena, but otherwise the sites diverge. Another recent example is found in Bellettini and Kempf (2013) , which model the size and location of a public facility within a community under alternative arrangements of organized household lobbying relative to what would be selected by an idealized social planner.
Overwhelmingly, the models of this literature assume away the boundary problem in order to reach an efficient interlocal siting, although numerous scholars have raised concerns of regulatory behavior along borders (Bednar 2009 , Hall 2008 , Mank 1995 , Revesz 2008 , Wiygul and Harrington, Gray and Shadbegian 2004 Woods 2010, 2012) . The most notable exception is the formal model of Ingberman (1995) where these concerns are moved to the forefront of the analysis. The Ingberman model treats disamenities as a function of distance but compensation is distributed in a lump sum within the entire jurisdiction. The majority of the voters accept host fees when the median distance-to-nuisance individual suffers less than the average mean disamenity, producing an acceptable host fee that is less than the aggregate disamenity costs to the community. Furthermore, Ingberman shows that when threatened by a host site across the border, then the host fee compensation falls to zero in a prisoners' dilemma style-equilibrium that sites the facility on the border, providing a motivating rational for a higher level of centralized government. Of course, a large literature in game theory exists to demonstrate that prisoners' dilemma equilibrium do not hold when the setting is modified to become a repeat game or when players have sufficient opportunity to retaliate against noncooperative moves.
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Empirical literature on the political border hypothesis has largely sought to consider the validity of the concern by finding differences in regulatory behavior along political boundaries.
The relevant counterfactuals differ by study, in some cases using a counterfactual where border proximity of non-hazardous establishments are compared to hazardous (e.g. Monogan et al 2014) , the incidence of hazardout output along borders compared to non-borders (e.g. Helland and Whitford, 2002; Sigman 2005; Sigman 2002; Shadbegian 2004, 2007; Woods 2010, 2012) , and the incidence of hazardous output along borders under alternative degrees of central government regulatory stringency.
III. THEORY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
The theoretical literature on zoning and nuisance siting has generally involved eliciting conditions for compensation and political mechanisms that result in efficiency. As summarized in the previous section, this literature has been normative in attempts to provide alternative voting mechanisms and auctions for development rights. In the United States, local general purpose governments are relatively homogenous in their political structure when compared with this literature in that they use majority rule to determine political representatives. A simple model that lends itself to empirical testing will be provided here to retain the emphasis on the potential for political borders to result in inefficient land siting via disamenity exporting.
Theory
Suppose two communities, A and B, are evenly divided in land and population on a rectangular island so that they share a border along one-side of their respective communities. The people of this island are uniformly distributed across properties they own, unable to relocate, and homogenous in their utility functions and wealth endowments. A firm owned by a non-resident wishes to locate a nuisance structure on the island, where all potential sites on the island are perfect substitutes. This firm is a monopsony demander of land for this use. Individual property owners are perfectly competitive at the parcel level, permitting a structure to be built at an opportunity cost that is equal across all owners. The firm's facility, however, carries a negative externality that imposes a fixed cost of d on every individual i that is constant within a radius of r, after which the externality decays to zero. The total external nuisance costs of siting the firm will be equal to
Both communities on the island have zoning which blocks the development of the nuisance structure, but will revise this policy in exchange for fiscal compensation. Public policies on this island are approved according to the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency (KHE) criterion, so the compensation need only theoretically be capable of compensating those who are harmed by the externality.
In order to demonstrate the political border's effects, the reference case will be one in which the two communities perfectly collude to bargain with the firm. They jointly bargain for fiscal compensation (F), which under the KHE criterion implies that they will only accommodate the land use if this compensation exceeds the nuisance costs:
Using arbitrary parameters, Figure 1 illustrates the minimum acceptable sum of host fees for the hypothetical island at each parcel of land in this stylized example. At this point, it should be clear that the sites of minimum acceptable financial compensation will appear at the corners of the island so as to minimize the number of people affected by the nuisance structure. 4 Under perfect joint bargaining of the local governments, the presence of the political boundary through the middle of the island does not alter the payoffs for any party in negotiation. Although the purpose of this model is not to elicit the overall welfare efficiencies of fiscal zoning in a political democracy, it is clear that the model retains the characteristic that the firm will seek out areas that confer the least external damage because it internalizes the costs.
Suppose now each community bargains separately and according to own community selfinterest so that nuisance dagages falling on members of the opposing community are ignored.
Both communities evaluate the impact from accommodating land use by weighing a fiscal payment against the cumulative damages on their own population:
Changing the criterion for acceptance from equation (1) to (2) causes the political border to have the same minimum acceptable financial compensation as the other borders surrounding the island. This alone would result in more potential land sites than the joint criterion of equation (1).
Case B of Figure 1 illustrates the minimum acceptable host fee in this non-cooperative scenario.
If it is the case that the firm locates along the political border, then the community whose side of the border is chosen by the firm will experience a pay-off of ! − !" !∈!|! , and the community on the opposing side receives − !! ! !∈!|! ! because it is assumed the firm will provide no fiscal recompense to those outside the accepting community.
With these payoffs determined, assume that the firm simultaneously solicits bids from both communities for the financial payment required from the firm in order to receive accommodative zoning with the intention to locate in the community with the lowst bid. Also define a position that can be sited for the firm's nuisance structure that is ε j distance within j's territory, but is small enough that
If they provide matching bids, then the firm flips a coin to determine location so that the payoff becomes ! ! ! − . Finally, define an F* greater than D which serves as the reservation price that defines the firm's economic break-even point. To determine equilibrium, we can identify best response strategies for j under different choices of ! ! from community j': 
Figure 2 plots these best response functions for each community on the basis of the above six conditions. The only outcome satisfying Nash equilibrium is ! = ! ! = 0, in which case the firm will not ultimately internalize the nuisance costs they impose upon nearby residents.
Furthermore, the model demonstrates that the degree of nuisance, measured by the magnitude of D, is not necessarily indicative of how close entities should be to the border, as the Nash Equilibrium is zero.
Ultimately, the model provided captures the essential welfare concerns in the previous literature. In the non-cooperative model where the localities compete raises the probability that nuisance use will be approved at the border. If the two communities jointly bargained, or if a social planner bargained on their behalf, the probability of nuisance use approval at a parcel near the political boundary would be no more likely than any other parcel in the domain. Therefore, instances in which bargaining costs are lower between local governments, or when they have a collaborative agent in common to aid in bargaining, provide potential mechanisms for the noncooperative outcome to fail to be realized. It can also be the case that local governments can play repeated games, where they can adjust land use regulation in a manner that can directly alter the economic value of the location to the firm, which would incentivize the firm to deliberately seek cooperative agreements.
Empirical Strategy
Importantly, the theoretical models aids in the development of an empirical strategy towards hypothesis testing. First, the model provides a clear prediction of where nuisances ultimately locate within a given locality, which aids in determining an appropriate unit of observation and criteria for data collection. . That is, if a locality plays host to a nuisance entity, the probability of the nuisance being along a political border increases to the extent the locality and its neighbors were unable to solve the collective action problem of joint bargaining with the nuisance. The empirical design can use land parcels as the unit of observation, restricted to land areas that are within localities that play host to a selected nuisance entity. 5 Secondly, the model suggests that the nuisance should be sited so that the border is within the spatial distance of the nuisance's range of negative externalities. Payoffs for the actors of the model only change when they are within this range, and it is not the case that moving a nuisance closer to the border is reflective of 5 The term "parcel" is employed here generically, rather than in the legal definition of parcel. Using actual parcels present the problem that they are formed endogenously through legal agreements to concatenate or split land tracts.
a collective action failure outside of that range. The econometric model can therefore be specified as
where y is the probability that land parcel i in locality j is exposed to the externalities of a nuisance entity.
As in the theoretical section, r is the radial distance within which residents experience the negative externality. The domain of localities included in j are limited to only those which have a nuisance entity within their political boundaries. The main variable of interest in equation (3) is a dummy variable B that indicates land parcel i to be within a specified distance of locality j's nearest border:
If the localities are incapable of resolving the joint bargaining problem then γ>0 as the Nash equilibrium condition places nuisance entities along the political borders.
6 If joint bargaining is accomplished, then the political borders will have no disproportionate draw for nuisance sitings.
The theory also predicts a within-locality choice of placement, motivating the inclusion of 6 A natural alternative to the dependent variable and border variable B would have been to employ the actual distances, which would avoid the need to define r. However, this is both atheoretical and incapable of testing the hypothesis of interest. The latter point can be most easily understood if one considered the within-locality fixed effects specification of equation (3) in a case where a single nuisance entity existed near the border of a squareshaped locality. On average, all observations moving further away from the border (i.e. closer to the center) reduce their distance to the nuisance. locality fixed effects in ! . Importantly, this term also captures unobservable characteristics across the localities that do not vary within the locality, which might include attributes like state policy or the propensity of the local government to accept a nuisance.
It is worth pointing out that there is uncertainty over the range of distances defined by the parameter r. The range of negative externalities is oftentimes a matter of public dispute and may vary across locations for a host of reasons unobservable to the researcher. To the extent that r is defined too narrowly, treatments will be incorrectly coded in the control group and bias γ towards zero. When r is similarly too large, then observations in the control contaminate the treatment group and once again bias γ in the direction of finding a null response. In these cases where r is uncertain, the estimation of equation (3) represents a conservative test of the boundary hypothesis, and sensitivity analysis should be undertaken of alternative assumptions over r.
The final term in equation (3) to be discussed is the potential role of control variables in X for causal hypothesis testing. The theoretical model treated all land points within a locality as perfect substitutes for the nuisance owning firm. If political borders, however, are systematically located in areas that are more or less favorable than others within the localities then they introduce bias to the estimate of γ. The selection of variables in X should therefore be motivated by parcel level attributes that plausibly introduce this concern.
IV. APPLICATION TO WIND TURBINES
In order apply the strategy for testing the border hypothesis to wind turbines, some background is appropriate. First, the land siting process for wind turbines is described. Second, it is established that the wind turbines serve as an appropriate example of the nuisance siting concerns. Finally, the idiosyncratic aspects of wind farm sitings from these topics is drawn together to inform data collection, selection of control variables, and other relevant hypotheses towards identifying political boundary effects.
Wind Turbine and Farm Siting
In order to develop a new wind turbine or farm, developers generally undertake a multi-step process. This process includes identifying suitable land, working with the local and state governments to ensure compliance with regulations, and discussing plans with landowners and other local stakeholders to identify concerns, levels of support for the development, and rate of compensation.
In choosing suitable land, developers generally identify low-density areas with high wind speeds. They then limit their land options to that which is not protected for wildlife or ecosystem preservation, and in compliance with local ordinances on setback requirements, noise levels, or other restrictions. Energy policies play a role in land choice as well, since developers are more inclined to locate a wind turbine or farm in a location that provides extra compensation for the resulting wind energy.
Not all developers meet with landowners and local stakeholders before beginning the siting process but many scholars and developers find that incorporating public knowledge and participatory engagement into the planning process is an important step in planning and siting a wind farm (Aitken, 2010; Anderson, 2013; Baxter et al., 2013; Bell et al., 2007; Bidwell, 2013; Graham et al., 2009; Heagle et al., 2011; Jobert et al., 2007) . Information gathered at these events can help a developer determine whether a proposed project is appropriate for a specific community. Community engagement in the planning process can also help attenuate negative social reactions to wind siting. Others also stress the importance of a concern for distributive justice in the wind siting planning process (Agterbosch et al., 2009) , and the importance of multistakeholder discussions (Cass and Walker, 2009 Siting requires consideration of safety and security. Safety considerations include factors such as ice, tower or blade failure, fires, or other potential dangers associated with the turbine.
Setbacks, the distance between the windmill and building structures, can be set to protect humans in the event of these failures. When siting a turbine or wind farm, there are other factors that one must consider as well. Visual impacts, for example, may be studied through public discussion or visual impact assessments, or automatically defined according to ordinances that dictate aesthetics. Sound limits can be set through property uses, ordinances, or other regulations.
Developers negotiate payments with landowners to place turbines on their properties (i.e., to rent the land on which the turbine sits). The majority of developers pay between $5,000 and $10,000 per turbine, and sometimes upwards of $14,000 per turbine. These payments usually last between 20 and 30 years. Since a wind turbine and its access roads usually require about onequarter or up to one-half an acre of land, most landowners consider this application a good return on one's crop land (Interviewee, 2013) .
Empirical studies confirm that wind farm development is dependent on population distribution, renewable energy policies such as the renewable portfolio standard, 7 the regulatory status of a state's electricity market, and the ease of the siting and permitting processes for wind developers (Bohn and Lant, 2009) . Local participation and opposition is also important, where places that encourage community involvement have an easier time siting the turbines, assuming that the community is generally supportive. There is evidence that wind potential, as a measure of wind energy that is possible given the wind speed at a specific location, is an important condition for wind turbine functionality but may be less important than these other factors (Bohn and Lant, 2009) . In other words, sufficient wind speed is a necessary condition for wind turbines to work, but is not sufficient for the development of the wind farm. When choosing among locations with comparable wind speed lands, a developer will place significant weight on population density, siting ease, preexisting incentives, and market structure factors.
Wind Turbines as a Nuisance Entity
Wind turbines can be classified as a nuisance when one suffers from or is at risk of suffering from the concomitant negative physical conditions of standard turbine operation. We divide the 7 A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is a state-level mandate that a certain percentage of a state's electricity must come from renewable energy by a certain year (e.g., 20% renewable energy by 2020). Although states allow different renewable energy resources to satisfy its RPS requirements, all states include wind energy in their list of eligible resources. As of 2009, 94% of all new renewable energy in RPS states was wind (Wiser et al., 2011) . Wind is generally the first renewable resource to be built because it has a lower levelized cost of electricity that all other renewable resources. RPS policies are increasingly popular among U.S. states: as of mid-2012, 43 states and the District of Columbia had an RPS policy, either mandatory or voluntary. Most states are also within sufficient distance of another state with an RPS policy to be able to sell renewable energy credits (RECs) on a $/kWh basis for their wind generation. Studies have found the RPS policy to effectively increase renewable energy generation (Carley, 2009 ). discussion of wind nuisances into those that directly affect human health and wellbeing, and those that indirectly affect health and wellbeing by degrading one's happiness.
Included in the category of health and wellbeing nuisances are ice accumulation, shadow flicker, and noise levels. Ice has been shown to accumulate on turbine blades in Nordic environments, which affects the performance of the turbine but can also throw ice to the ground (Dalili et al., 2009) Finally, wind turbines make noise from the swooshing of the blades as well as other operations.
Some studies find that, although models predict noise from turbines at around 45 dB when 350 meters (0.22 miles) away from a turbine and 35-40 dB when 1,000 meters (0.625 miles) away, the higher range estimates find that different ambient conditions can alter sound levels by 5-15 dB with noise disturbance limits of 1.9 km (Acoustic Ecology Institute, 2009). Noise levels also vary depending on the turbine itself, background noise levels, and nighttime conditions (King et al., 2012) . Smaller turbines tend to be noisier due to their design and lack of sound-reduction technologies (Rogers et al., 2006) . It is important to note that studies are inconclusive about the actual health effects of these issues, yet the industry and policymakers have devoted increasing attention to methods and regulations that reduce these nuisances. Critically, the perception of these problems by individuals near proposed wind farm sites is just as significant as the factual basis.
Studies that consider social acceptance of a variety of different types of energy resources, such as coal, nuclear, and wind, among others, find that perceptions of environmental harm associated with an energy resource dictate acceptance (Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2009) , and that wind is considered more favorably to other resources (Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2009; Bidwell, 2013) . Perceptions of health risk, community benefits, and community enhancement, as well as general preferences for energy generated from one source over another also affect social acceptance (Baxter et al., 2013) . Others find, when studying wind exclusively, that perceived economic benefits of wind drives perceptions about the technology (Bidwell, 2013) , particularly positive impressions (Rygg, 2012; Slattery et al., 2012) ; and negative impressions tend to be driven by concerns over environmental, land use, and aesthetic impacts, as well as health concerns (Rygg, 2012) . One of the common factors for wind turbine opposition is a concern for distributional justice of the local benefit associated with wind turbines (Hall et al., 2013; Gross, 2007) .
There are also several wind turbine issues that do not relate directly to health but may still affect social acceptance. Most notably, in some places wind turbines cause wildlife and habitat displacement or casualties, such as bird or bat deaths. The average bird fatality rate for a wind turbine is 14 birds per MW per year, most of which are songbirds. Wind turbines also contribute to bat deaths, although the rates are generally quite low (National Wind Coordinating Collaborative, 2010). 
Data and Empirical Strategy Applied to Wind Turbines
The data for the location and selected characteristics of individual wind turbines is obtained from For each wind turbine in the continental states where local governments are responsible for zoning, the relevant unit of government is identified. Cities and towns are the relevant units for incorporated land area in all states. Table 1 provides the categorizations of unincorporated land for zoning powers among the states that do have a wind turbine. 9 The dataset initially included 57,882 wind turbines on land in the continental states, which was reduced to 57,299 after dropping those in the three states where they would be subjected to state zoning authority.
Wind turbines are overwhelmingly located in unincorporated areas, as just 1,005 turbines are found in 276 incorporated cities and towns. The remaining 56,294 turbines are distributed across 988 zoning authorities of unincorporated areas.
It is worth noting that zoning is oftentimes more passive or reactionary in unincorporated areas partly because there is rarely any type of development being proposed that would generate controversy among the residents. When these authorities are not active it often gives the impression that "there is no zoning" in some areas. In reality, it is more accurate to describe these areas as extremely accommodating because there is little to regulate, but is capable of organizing should a controversial type of development arise. This paper functionally treats areas that do not act on their authority as being equivalent to those who are active but completely accommodating.
After identifying the relevant zoning authorities that host wind turbines, a grid of equidistant points are generated on the land surface of these areas to represent potential land points. These points are spaced apart by 0.0025 decimal degrees, which is a little over one-sixth of a mile. 10 The resulting datasets represents more than 12.9 million observations across 1,264 zoning authorities.
For each wind turbine in this dataset, Figure 3 demonstrates the cumulative density function by proximity to the nearest border segment of the relevant zoning authority. As can be seen in the figure, a little over half of all wind turbines reside within approximately three miles of the border, but only about 10 percent are within one-half mile. The concern for drawing a causal inference, of course, is that there exists some omitted attribute that systematically varies within these areas which are correlated with the proximity of borders that would also draw the presence of windfarms. For example, population and housing density might systematically differ near the political boundaries than elsewhere in the locality, affecting the probability of being a suitable windfarm site. Wind speed may increase near municipal borders because natural terrain features that can affect wind speed (e.g. rivers or hills) have sometimes served as a basis for determining the locations of borders. Borders that track along rivers might also raise watershed and other environmental compliance concerns that change the cost of locating the windfarm closer to the border. Furthermore, major roadways lower the cost of creating a transmission system for the distribution of the generated energy, as they can make use of existing utility rights to the infrastructure. These potential explanatory variables that violate our random assignment are included in X ij , with definitions, sources, and summary statistics provided in Table 2 .
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Also relevant to drawing inference in the results is in the definition of the range of externality dissemination, referred to as r in Section 3. The range of the various wind turbine externalities is clearly a matter of debate, but zoning regulations generally seem defined as if the noise externalities to be relevant withing 300 to 1,000 meters. These figures serve as a benchmark for determining whether or not a given parcel is "near" the border or a wind turbine in the context of the externality in discussion. As explained in section 3, too small or large of a range will bias the coefficient towards the finding of no effect, so a sensitivity analysis on the choice of r will be included as part of the results section. For this reason, the summary statistics in Table 2 list differing range for the definition of "near" for the variables dependent on this assumption. At a range of a quarter mile, 1.82 percent of all parcels are considered to be "near" a wind turbine, and three percent of parcels also meet the criteria of being "near the border" at this range.
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11 Each of these variables is plausibly endogenous to the proximity of wind farms, but their true causal effects are not the intended inference of this paper. 12 The summary statistics of Table 1 have the same scaling employed in the regression results to follow. The dependent variable is pre-multiplied by 100 so that the coefficients require fewer decimal places and can be interpreted as the effect on the percentage probability.
The main variable of interest is the dummy variable indicating that the parcel is within the nuisance range of the externality, corresponding to B in equation (3). If the non-cooperative equilibrium holds, being along the border will increase the probability of having land nuisance sited. If the cooperative equilibrium holds, being along the border should have no effect, or even reduce the probability of being siting a nuisance.
V. RESULTS
The results for the estimation of equation (3) are presented under alternative model restrictions in Table 3 . The linear probability model is applied and the dependent variable was pre-multiplied by 100, so all coefficients can be directly interpreted as the predicted effect on the percentage chance of the parcel being near a wind turbine. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered by zoning authority are reported in parentheses, and all specifications include fixed effects by zoning authority. For Table 3 , the range for defining "near" is 0.10 miles is employed to demonstrate the sensitivity of the results to the use of control variables, and subsequent tables will examine the sensitivity of the fully specified model to the range choice. Table 3 demonstrates in all specifications that being near the border decreases the likelihood of being near a wind turbine by 0.267 to 0.245 percent. This is more consistent with the cooperative outcome rather than a non-cooperative equilibrium posited by the political boundary hypothesis. In fact, it suggests that political boundaries are more costly rather than less. This is also a substantive effect considering that 0.41 percent of all observations are within 0.10 miles of a wind turbine, so the effect size is about 61 percent of the dependent variable's mean.
The most negative effect size comes when excluding all control variables in specification A, but inclusion control variables has only trivial influence on the point estimate for the variable of interest. This is suggestive of a causal interpretation, if the political boundaries are not correlated with other factors that would presumably matter. Among these other control variables, wind rating is positively correlated and statistically significant at the one percent level. Increasing the number of housing units in the parcel's Census Block Group reduces the likelihood that the parcel is also near a wind turbine, while population is insignificant after conditioning on housing units. 13 Only the distance to the nearest primary or secondary road is statistically significant, and consistent with expectations the further away the nearest road is the less likely the parcel is to be near a wind turbine. River proximity is not statistically significant in Table 3 . Table 4 reports the results for alternative definitions of the range of externalities, going from a low of 0.10 miles to a max of 0.5 miles, which are the lowest and highest ranges for which being on the border produces a statistically significant effect. As discussed previously, the range of relevant externalities that concern land use decisions is uncertain, and coding the range too small or too large will bias the results towards finding a null effect even if the hypothesized effect is true. Indeed, relative to the mean of the dependent variable, the effect size increases and peaks at 0.20 miles for the reported results. Statistical significance exists in the range from 0.10 to 0.30 miles, and the absolute size of the coefficient is almost zero at 0.5 miles. The weight of the evidence here is against the hypothesis that a competitive equilibrium will be realized where local governments site these nuisances along their political boundaries, and is somewhat more consistent with them siting near the borders but no so close as to spill-over into the neighboring zoning authority.
13 Housing and population are correlated within one another. Excluding one results in a negative coefficient for the other with no clear impact on the rest of the regression, so we just present the model with both included. Table 4 , but the slope modifier does demonstrate a suggestive countervailing effect. However, the precision on this variable is so low that it cannot be deemed statistically different from zero.
In summary, the results of this paper provide robust evidence that the political border is a deterrent to the siting of wind turbines, which is not supportive of the concern that local governments will be locked in a prisoner's dilemma of accommodative land use regulation along the border.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The practice of fiscal zoning by local governments enjoys substantive support from many corners of economic theory, as it can align the incentives of political actors with allocating land rights to their most valued use. This is particularly true in cases where potential land uses might confer spatial externalities, in which case zoning authorities can facilitate Coasian bargains that satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion. One concern in this literature, however, has been that the presence of political boundaries that internalize fiscal consequences without forestalling the spatial externalities. While this political boundary concern has been studied extensively in theoretical models and enjoys some degree of conventional wisdom, empirical work has been limited to state and federal tests of regulation permissiveness. This paper derives a simple theoretical model for the local nuisance siting decision that retains the concerns of the literature and more readily lends itself to empirical adaptation. Under this approach, this paper represents the first empirical test of the political boundary hypothesis in local government zoning using the case of wind turbines.
Using the location of 57,299 wind turbines in 1,258 local governments that contain more than 12.9 million potential land sites, the results of this paper provide robust evidence against the concern that local governments will overaccomodate nuisance entities near their political boundaries. In fact, the results suggest that political boundaries act like a deterrent, and that political boundaries are unusually costly for location. The difference between incorporated and unincorporated local governments in this proclivity is not statistically significant.
The next phase of this research is to expand the study to make political boundary segments the relevant unit of analysis, and identify determinants of wind turbine proximity. This will lend itself to a study of border features that incentivize local government proclivity towards cooperative relationships. Also, additional research is needed on alternative forms of nuisances aside from wind turbines. Notes: The darker the shade, the higher the communities minimum willingness to accept to accommodate the nuisance at that location. The red line represents the political boundary separating the two communities. Notes: "N" indicates the Nash equilibrium at zero dollars. "F i " indicates the Fee to be set by community i, where F' i (F j ) is the best response of community i to the fee set by community j. "D" is the fee equaling the total external damage of the nuisance. The dashed line is the 45-degree line. 
